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Abstract—Permission systems are the main defense that mobile
platforms, such as Android and iOS, offer to users to protect
their private data from prying apps. However, due to the
tension between usability and control, such systems have several
limitations that often force users to overshare sensitive data. We
address some of these limitations with SmarPer, an advanced
permission mechanism for Android. To address the rigidity of
current permission systems and their poor matching of users’
privacy preferences, SmarPer relies on contextual information
and machine learning methods to predict permission decisions
at runtime. Note that the goal of SmarPer is to mimic the
users’ decisions, not to make privacy-preserving decisions per se.
Using our SmarPer implementation, we collected 8,521 runtime
permission decisions from 41 participants in real conditions. With
this unique data set, we show that using an efficient Bayesian
linear regression model results in a mean correct classification
rate of 80% (±3%). This represents a mean relative reduction
of approximately 50% in the number of incorrect decisions
when compared with a user-defined static permission policy,
i.e., the model used in current permission systems. SmarPer also
focuses on the suboptimal trade-off between privacy and utility;
instead of only “allow” or “deny” type of decisions, SmarPer
also offers an “obfuscate” option where users can still obtain
utility by revealing partial information to apps. We implemented
obfuscation techniques in SmarPer for different data types and
evaluated them during our data collection campaign. Our results
show that 73% of the participants found obfuscation useful and
it accounted for almost a third of the total number of decisions.
In short, we are the first to show, using a large dataset of real in
situ permission decisions, that it is possible to learn users’ unique
decision patterns at runtime using contextual information while
supporting data obfuscation; this is an important step towards
automating the management of permissions in smartphones.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones can be considered the most personal comput-
ing devices we have today, due to their popularity and the
increasing amount of personal information they collect. To
control third-party apps’ access to this sensitive information,
mobile platforms such as Android and iOS rely on a permis-
sion system where users can allow or deny apps’ permission
requests. In general, users define an access control policy that
is enforced by the mobile OS at runtime.
1Parts of this work were carried out while Katarzyna Olejnik and Moham-
mad Emtiyaz Khan were working at EPFL and Ke´vin Huguenin was working
at LAAS-CNRS.
Unfortunately, due to the trade-off between usability (i.e.,
permission management) and the level of control offered (i.e.,
granularity of permissions), current mobile permission systems
have several limitations. For instance, users’ permission deci-
sions represent a static policy, i.e., once a permission decision
is made, it will not change without user intervention (Android
6+ and iOS). This approach assumes that permission decisions
are not context-dependent and rarely change over time. Yet,
researchers have shown evidence of the contrary [1], [2]. For
example, a user might be willing to grant an app access to
her location if she is using it, but she might be reluctant
to do so if the app is in the background. Our user survey
(Section V) confirms this idea: Only 19% of the participants
stated that context is not important to them. The results of
our study also show that users’ decisions are not static—for
similar permission requests, many participants changed their
decision at least once.
To support context-aware permission policies, a simple
approach is to prompt users at runtime to make a decision.
In this way, users will have more contextual information and
a better understanding of the purpose of the request [2].
Android 6+ and iOS support permission decisions at runtime,
but only the first time an app requests a permission. Hence,
the resulting policy only captures a single user’s context.
CyanogenMod [3] and permission tools such as XPrivacy [4]
and LBE Privacy Guard [5] offer users with an “always-ask”
option to indicate what requests should be always prompted
at runtime. This approach enables a better matching of users’
privacy preferences, but it requires a significant effort from the
user. For example, a single app can make tens to hundreds of
sensitive requests per day, even if the user is not interacting
with it [2]. As users have on average close to 95 apps [6] and
each app requires around 5 permissions [7], it is clear that
runtime decisions can overwhelm users or cause habituation to
prompts. Hence, to support context-aware permission policies,
advanced mechanisms are needed to help users with the
overhead introduced by runtime permissions.
Another important limitation of current permission systems
is their sub-optimal trade-off between privacy and utility, as
users can only allow (i.e., no privacy) or deny (i.e., no utility)
access to their private information. As a result, to benefit
from apps’ functionalities, users often have no choice but
to overshare personal information. A better trade-off can be
achieved by providing users with additional decision types,
where sensitive information is only partially revealed to apps
in exchange for some utility, i.e., data obfuscation. For in-
stance, to check the weather forecast, a user could reveal her
approximated location instead of the precise one. In our user
survey (Section V), 73% of the participants reported finding
data obfuscation useful.
To address the aforementioned limitations, we propose
“Smart Permissions” (“SmarPer”), an advanced permission
mechanism for Android with three main goals: context-
aware permissions, automatic decision-making at runtime, and
data obfuscation. SmarPer follows a platform-agnostic design
where apps’ sensitive requests are intercepted at runtime and
users are prompted for a decision, i.e., allow, obfuscate, deny.
By observing users’ responses, SmarPer progressively learns
to predict and make decisions on behalf of users. It should be
noted that the goal of SmarPer is to mimic users’ decisions,
not to make privacy-preserving decisions or to find a balance
between utility and privacy. In other words, if a user makes
poor privacy decisions, SmarPer will do the same.
SmarPer relies on machine learning to predict users’ per-
mission decisions. Instead of using a multi-class classifier ap-
proach, as prior work in this area2 [8], [9], we model the prob-
lem as a linear regression problem, using a one-dimensional
privacy-preference function that outputs the degree of privacy
of each user for each request (allow<obfuscate<deny). Specif-
ically, by using a set of contextual features, we use a Bayesian
linear regression model (BLR) to fit a linear regression to each
users’ decision data. This model has several advantages: It is
lightweight enough for smartphones, and it is well suited for
limited amounts of training data. Also, by training directly in
the smartphone a model per-user, it preserves users’ privacy.
We use an implementation of SmarPer, based on XPri-
vacy [4], to collect at runtime permission decisions from 41
participants3. Each participant used SmarPer (in fully manual
mode) for a period of at least 10 days. Unlike previous
studies [2], [10], ours relies on decision data collected in
real conditions, i.e., participants using SmarPer daily on their
own or loaned devices with their own apps. In total, we
collected 8,521 unique permission decisions, along with 32
raw contextual features per decision (e.g., time, location, app
name, etc.). Using this unique data set, our model achieves
a mean absolute error (MAE) of 0.22 (±0.03)4 and a mean
incorrect classification rate (ICR) of 0.20 (±0.03), i.e., a
mean correct classification rate (CCR) of 80% (±3%). This
represents a mean relative improvement of 55% for the MAE
and 50% for the ICR over a static policy baseline, where
participants manually define permission decisions, i.e., the
model used by current permission systems. Our results show
that it is possible to learn the decision patterns of users with
2Note that prior work uses machine learning to predict users’ static per-
mission configurations instead of runtime permission decisions.
3This user study was approved by our institution’s IRB (ethical committee).
4On a scale from -1 to +1; thus, the maximum value for the MAE is 2.
good accuracy, even when training data is scarce, and that
contextual information is key for such a task.
We also implemented in SmarPer obfuscation techniques
for four data types: location, contacts, storage, and camera.
During our data-collection campaign, we evaluated three of
these techniques with our participants. Our results demonstrate
the importance of obfuscation: Obfuscate accounted for 27%
of the total number of decisions collected and, in our user
survey, 80% of the participants stated that they would like to
obfuscate additional data types. Few users reported compatibil-
ity problems with apps. We believe this is the first evaluation
of obfuscation techniques in smartphones on this scale.
It is important to mention that there are two key parts in the
SmarPer project. First, modeling users’ permission-decision
patterns by using contextual information and data obfusca-
tion. This part requires a user study to collect the decision
data required to assess the potential of our machine learning
approach. Second, evaluating our machine learning approach
in practice (including user perception and the use of SmarPer’s
features), through a new field experiment and user study. In
this paper, we present the results associated with the first part.
We are currently working towards the second part.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• Design and partial implementation of SmarPer. We
present a platform-agnostic design to support context-
aware and automatic decisions at runtime, and data
obfuscation. Our implementation, publicly available as
an open-source project [11], offers runtime collection of
permission decisions and associated contextual features,
and data obfuscation for four data types.
• Unique data set of permission decisions. We collected
8,521 runtime permission decisions and their context
from 41 participants. We believe this is the largest and
most realistic data set of this type. After the approval of
our university’s ethical committee, we made a sanitized
subset of this data set publicly available [11].
• Evaluation of the potential of automatic prediction
techniques for permission decisions. We use an adapted
linear regression model and demonstrate that it achieves
significant performance improvements over two carefully
chosen baselines. Our results show that contextual infor-
mation is key to accurately predict permission decisions.
In addition, we show that a per-user model has better
performance than a one-size-fits-all model, as the former
is able to better capture users’ unique privacy preferences.
• Machine learning framework. We provide a framework
for carefully training and comparing different context-
aware models that predict permission decisions. The
framework’s source code is also available online [11].
• Implementation and evaluation of data obfuscation.
We develop obfuscation techniques for four data types
in SmarPer and evaluate them in our data-collection
campaign. This is one of the first and largest evaluations
of obfuscation in smartphones with real users.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II
highlights related work in the area of mobile permission
systems. Section III presents SmarPer’s design goals and ar-
chitecture. Section IV describes our SmarPer implementation.
Section V explains our data-collection methodology and the
resulting data set. Section VI describes our machine learning
methodology to predict users’ decisions using contextual
information and presents the results of our performance
evaluation. Section VII further discusses our data set and
machine learning results, and the limitations of our study.
Finally, Section VIII presents our concluding remarks and
future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
Mobile permission systems have several limitations that
cause users [12], [13] and developers [14] difficulty in under-
standing and managing them. Researchers propose different
extensions to current permission models to provide users with
more control and better management [8], [15]–[19]. Yet, most
of these approaches do not support contextual information in
their access control policies (i.e., static policies). The lack
of context-awareness in mobile permission systems has also
been addressed in previous work [1], [2], [20]–[23]. Still, most
of the proposed solutions are not practical for average users,
as they require manually defining context-aware policies for
each (app, permission, inferred context) tuple. In contrast, our
work focuses on the automatic inference of these policies from
users’ decision-making behavior in different contexts. Another
limitation is the lack of decision-granularity i.e., only “allow”
or “deny” decisions. To address this issue, researchers propose
sending fake or obfuscated data to apps [18], [22], [24], [25].
Yet, most of these solutions have not been evaluated with users
in real scenarios. To fill this gap, we implement obfuscation
techniques for different data types in Android and perform one
of the first evaluations of obfuscation with real users.
With the increasing number of apps and data types, another
important area of study is helping users to efficiently manage
permissions. Machine learning has been used to automate
decision-making in other areas such as location-based services
and social networks [26]–[29]. In the area of mobile devices,
researchers propose crowdsourcing [19] and machine learning
to help users manage permissions [8], [9], [30]. For instance,
Lin et al. and Liu et al. identify a small number of “privacy
profiles”, using clustering techniques that could be used to
facilitate static permission configuration for different types of
users [8], [9], [30]. Also, Liu et al. [8] show that a binary
classifier can predict users’ static permission decisions with
high accuracy. These works, however, focus on static permis-
sion policies that do not change over time, i.e., no context-
awareness, and they rely on a one-size-fits-all approach, i.e.,
training a single model with data from all users.
Closer to our work, Wijesekera et al. [2] propose the use of
permission decisions at runtime to provide users with contex-
tual information to make more informed decisions. To reduce a
user’s load, they conclude that a mechanism should infer when
to prompt users or automatically block app requests (note that
this is not exactly the same as predicting users’ decisions).
The authors show how a one-size-fits-all mixed-effects logistic
regression model can be used for this purpose with good
accuracy, using a small data set of users’ decisions collected in
semi-realistic conditions, i.e., 673 decisions from 36 users col-
lected offline during an exit survey. We extend this line of work
in several ways. First, we demonstrate that it is possible to
predict users’ permission decisions with great accuracy, even
when we consider an additional decision type (i.e., obfuscate),
and that contextual information is key for doing so. Second,
we show that a per-user model is significantly more accurate
than a one-size-fits-all model, due to users’ unique privacy
preferences. Third, we provide an experimental framework
and methodology for carefully comparing the performance of
different machine learning algorithms that predict decisions
using contextual information. Fourth, we use a unique and
substantially larger data set of permission decisions per user,
collected in real conditions (i.e., 8,521 decisions from 41 users
collected at runtime in users’ smartphones), and we describe
the many challenges faced when doing so. Fifth, we provide a
design and partial prototype of a mechanism for predicting and
automating permission decisions and propose an approach for
automating permission decisions. Sixth, we design and imple-
ment obfuscation mechanisms in our prototype and evaluated
them with real users.
III. SMARPER
We address two important limitations of the current per-
mission systems: the use of static policies that do not capture
users’ privacy needs in different contexts, and the sub-optimal
trade-off between privacy and utility. We propose SmarPer,
an extension to Android’s permission system that supports
dynamic and automatic decision policies inferred from users’
behavior, and that provides finer-grained decisions, i.e., allow,
obfuscate, and deny. SmarPer provides a feedback loop where
users are initially prompted for permission decisions, and
over time SmarPer learns users’ decisions patterns and makes
decisions on behalf of the users. SmarPer can even adapt to
changes in users’ privacy posture. Note that, though SmarPer
targets Android, its concepts and design are platform-agnostic.
A. Threat Model
We focus on the case of privacy-invasive apps, that access
private data (e.g., location, camera) about users through the
dedicated APIs calls of the mobile OS. We do not address
the cases where the threat comes from the OS itself or from
apps that use native code or security breaches to access private
data. We assume that the considered apps access, in some
cases, more information than they actually need to provide
the features (and the associated quality of service) the users
actually need; this constitutes a privacy threat for the users.
B. Design Goals
SmarPer’s design follows three main goals: Context-aware
permissions, to support dynamic permission policies that
change according to users’ context; Automatic permission
decisions, to predict and make permission decisions at runtime
on behalf of the user and reduce users’ load; and Data
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Fig. 1. SmarPer architecture. Intercepted apps’ requests together with contextual information are used as input to a machine learning model
that predicts a decision. After step 5, a function c() takes as input the decision and other parameters to decide if the decision should be made
automatically or if the user should be prompted. All decisions and contextual information are stored for continually training the model.
obfuscation, to reduce the sensitive information revealed to
apps while maintaining some level of utility.
We also consider the following deployability goals: Effi-
ciency, to support SmarPer in hardware-constrained mobile
devices; Privacy, to guarantee that users’ decisions and contex-
tual information gathered will not compromise users’ privacy;
and Flexibility, to enable users to configure different obfusca-
tion techniques, privacy preferences, and learning rates, and
to correct possible prediction errors.
C. System Flow
Figure 1 shows the general architecture and data flow of
SmarPer. As stated before, SmarPer follows a feedback loop
approach. First, SmarPer intercepts a privacy-sensitive app
request (1), e.g., Android API call for location. The app
name, request type, and parameters in the API call are sent
for processing (2). Information about the current context is
collected from the device (3). This includes information about
the app (e.g., whether it is in the foreground or background),
smartphone state (e.g., whether the screen is locked), and
smartphone’s sensor information (e.g., location provided by
the GPS). For more details, see Section IV-C. All of this
information is processed into a feature vector that is input to
the machine learning model for prediction (4). Given the user’s
past decision and contextual data, the model predicts whether
the user would allow, obfuscate, or deny the request; and it out-
puts the predicted decision, along with other parameters such
as the estimated confidence (e.g., mean and variance) (5). A
function c() take as input the predicted decision and estimated
confidence, as well as other parameters such as current MAE,
prompt rate, and previous decisions, and it determines if the
predicted decision should be used (i.e., automatic decision) or
if the user should be prompted (Figure 2). The function c()
can be adjusted by the user to regulate the number of prompts.
When SmarPer has a decision (manual or automatic), it pre-
pares to respond to the requesting app (6). If the decision calls
for obfuscation, obfuscation is performed on the requested data
before returning it to the app (7), e.g., reducing the precision
of the location. SmarPer then responds to the app with the
requested data (8). Finally, the decision, contextual informa-
tion, and whether the decision was manual or automatic are
recorded in the SmarPer database (9). Optionally, the user can
review recent automatic decisions and correct them if they
are wrong (10). This user feedback is also incorporated in
the model (11 and 12). More specifically, the corresponding
corrected decisions are added to the training set and the model
is updated, possibly with higher weights. The user can set a
parameter to determine the cost-sensitivity, i.e., the user can
express which type of error they are more willing to tolerate
(oversharing or undersharing).
IV. SMARPER IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a partial version of SmarPer, compatible
with Android 4.0.3 to 5.1.1, to evaluate obfuscation techniques
and to collect permission decisions and their associated con-
textual information. During our field experiment (Section V),
our SmarPer implementation operated in full manual mode:
There were no automatic decisions or learning from users’
behavior, users were always prompted at runtime for deci-
sions. The performance of our machine learning model was
evaluated offline using the data collected (Section VI). Such
an offline machine learning approach, used by other works in
this area [2], [8], [23], enables the use of a larger variety of
machine learning tools and analysis techniques to assess the
potential of SmarPer. We focused on a robust implementation
to avoid interfering with the OS and apps and it is available
as an open-source project under a GPLv3 license [11].
A. Request Interception
Android and other popular mobile platforms do not provide
a native API to mediate apps’ requests, as suggested by Heuser
et al. [17]. Therefore, we took a rooted-device approach to
dynamically intercept apps’ requests, without modifying the
OS; rooting a device is easier than flashing a new firmware,
and there are millions of users with rooted devices [8].
To intercept privacy-sensitive API calls, our implementation
builds on the open-source permission tool XPrivacy v.3.6 [4].
XPrivacy is a module of the Xposed framework [31], a
general framework that lets users install modules to modify the
look and feel of their smartphone. It requires root privileges
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TABLE I
EFFECT OF EACH DECISION TYPE (ALLOW, OBFUSCATE, DENY) ON DIFFERENT DATA TYPES IN SmarPer. WE IMPLEMENTED OBFUSCATION FOR
LOCATION, CONTACTS, STORAGE, AND CAMERA AND EVALUATED THEM IN A FIELD EXPERIMENT WITH REAL USERS.
in order to change the app process executable to add an
additional library (Xposed). This enables developers to hook
Android API calls and execute code before or after API
call execution, to modify OS or apps’ functionalities. All of
these modifications are done in memory [32]. Note that there
is a chance that this request-interception approach could be
bypassed by (malicious) apps to avoid SmarPer; however, such
threats are out of the scope of this work. The main methods
we propose in this work, essentially obfuscating sensitive
data and predicting users’ decisions, are independent from the
underlying request interception technique used.
B. Data Obfuscation
In SmarPer, users can allow, obfuscate, or deny access to
their private data. By using the Xposed framework, we were
able to modify the parameters and return values of sensitive
API calls before or after it executes. The “allow” case is
straightforward: We allow the API call to execute without
modification. For “obfuscate”, we remove some level of detail
from the returned data. For “deny”, we return fake values.
We faced multiple challenges while implementing obfusca-
tion techniques. First, obfuscation is data dependent. Hence,
different techniques must be used for different data types; and
data types can have more than one obfuscation technique. For
instance, for the camera, we can reduce image resolution or
blur people faces. Hence, we envision a community of privacy-
conscious developers implementing obfuscation “plugins” for
SmarPer in the future. Second, the utility of each obfuscation
technique depends on the type of app and use case. For
example, to reduce the risk of unauthorized pictures, a QR
code scanner app can still work if obfuscation only blurs
people faces from images. Note that the privacy implications of
data obfuscation depend on the type of data, the data itself, and
on the background knowledge available to the adversary (e.g.,
a service provider or an ad network). Third, obfuscated data
could cause the app to crash or behave unexpectedly [24]: e.g.,
we noticed that the WhatsApp messenger app will not display
correctly the name of the user’s contacts if we obfuscate
access to the contacts database. Fourth, there is no native
support for obfuscation in mobile platforms. Therefore, to
implement obfuscation techniques, we need to understand the
low-level details of how the OS processes each data type.
We implemented obfuscation techniques for the following four
data types (Table I):
Location: We implemented location obfuscation by discretiz-
ing the Earth into 10km by 10km areas. Instead of returning
the user’s exact location, SmarPer returns the coordinates
of the center of the current area the user is in, as shown
by the green icon in the first row of Table I. The size of
these areas is easily configurable. A more privacy-consistent
solution would use a variable size based on the population
or point-of-interest density. More advanced location privacy-
protection mechanisms (LPPM) could also be considered such
as [33] (optimal grid-based obfuscation) or [34] (differential
privacy/geo-indistinguishability), as static obfuscation, based
on a fixed grid, is known to be vulnerable to attacks [35].
Apps generally ask for the user’s location to tailor some
features to the user’s location, e.g., ads or the current weather.
With this approach, apps can provide the same level of utility
while the user’s privacy increases, as their exact location is
not revealed. For the deny decision, a fixed set of coordinates
are returned. The level of privacy-protection provided by such
data obfuscation techniques can be captured by the (difference
of) accuracy of known inference mechanisms on location data
(e.g., filling the gaps in an obfuscated location trace [36] and
inferring activity preferences [37] and interests [38]).
Contacts: Implementing obfuscation for contacts was particu-
larly difficult. Android stores contact information in a SQLite
database. Apps can query this database to request any informa-
tion they need, as long as they have the READ CONTACTS
permission. With SmarPer, we have access to the actual
queries that apps make to the contacts database, as well as
a Cursor object with the returned data that we can modify
before it is returned to the app. To implement obfuscation, we
filtered out rows from this Cursor that are not names, phone
numbers, postal addresses, or e-mail addresses. Yet, because
apps have great flexibility to query this database, a column
identifying the type of the returned information is not always
present in the Cursor. This means that we might not know
what type of private data we are looking to filter out in the
result. If we have the type information, we filter out rows
that are not names, phone numbers, postal addresses, or e-
mail. Otherwise, we check all the columns containing data in
the returned Cursor with regular expressions for these four
allowed types. For phone number and e-mail we use the stan-
dard Android API calls PhoneNumberUtils.isReallyDialable()
and Patterns.EMAIL ADDRESS. Rows that do not match the
regular expression for name, phone number, postal address, or
e-mail are discarded from the result before it is returned to
the app. For the deny decision, SmarPer simulates an empty
address book by returning an empty Cursor.
Most apps request access to contacts to find user’s friends
already registered in the service. For this purpose, name, phone
number, postal address, or e-mail address should suffice. Users
can enter a variety of other (potentially sensitive) information
about their contacts into the contacts database, such as birth-
days, relationship to the user, and employer. Revealing this
information to an app does not have a clear use case. By
revealing only names, phone numbers, postal addresses, and
e-mail addresses, we maintain utility for the majority of apps
and reduce the amount of sensitive information revealed.
Storage: To implement obfuscation for storage, we restricted
access to the Android Public directories (accessible to all
apps with the READ EXTERNAL STORAGE permission) –
Pictures, Music, Movies, and DCIM (Camera pictures) that,
ironically, actually contain private data. For this purpose,
SmarPer returns a “FileNotFoundException”; this is an excep-
tion that an app should be prepared to handle: It can happen
that these files really do not exist. We also filter out these URIs
from queries made to MediaScanner, a service that keeps track
of all the user’s files on the device. For the deny case, SmarPer
simulates that the external storage is unmounted.
To create a cache on the external storage, some apps request
the WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE permission (which im-
plicitly includes READ EXTERNAL STORAGE permis-
sion). This functionality is preserved with our obfuscation
technique. However, a curious app which wants to sift through
the user’s photos will not be able to do so. Some apps, how-
ever, need write access to the Public directories, to save new
data there, e.g., photos. If this is the case, the user will need
to allow access to storage to preserve functionality. Evaluating
the privacy protection of such an obfuscation technique, or
more generally the privacy risks of accessing data on users’
SD card, highly depends on the data.
Camera: We obfuscated two aspects of the camera: the camera
preview (i.e., when the user opens the camera but has not
taken a photo yet) and taken photos. For both of these, we
reduce the resolution of the returned image by scaling down
and then scaling back up to the original size. The scaling factor
is configurable. For the deny case, we return a black image.
Apps with access to the camera pose a considerable threat
to user’s privacy: They can take photos without notification,
as long as the camera preview is open. Thus, we distort the
returned images. Yet, it is still possible to scan QR codes.
Therefore, QR code scanner apps maintain their utility and
the user maintains privacy. A more advanced alternative to
blurring the whole image would be to only blur or remove
detected faces or detected text [39] and/or window blind the
image [40]. A potential way to evaluate the privacy protection
of such obfuscation techniques is to evaluate the performance
of a standard library in inferring private attributes (e.g., gender
[41], age,5 ethnicity [42]) of the user, as well as the context
(e.g., emotions,5 activity) from the captured video/photo.
Future data types: In general, obfuscation techniques can be
implemented for most data types. As part of our future work,
we plan to implement obfuscation for other data types such as
microphone data (e.g., filtering out frequencies corresponding
to the human voice) and calendar data (e.g., filtering out
information from events such as location and invited guests).
Note that the implemented obfuscation techniques are some-
what simple and not optimal: They may offer only limited
protection for users’ privacy (depending on the data and on
the background knowledge available) and/or limit the utility
of the app. Yet, they offer more control to the user. They
also are a good starting point for evaluating users’ perception
of obfuscation in realistic and easy-to-understand scenarios.
We believe that obfuscation methods should be designed by
taking into account the specifics of the considered data, how
it is used by different (categories of) mobile apps, and the
privacy implications of the data disclosure, based on research
results in order to determine to which extent users can still be
tracked, identified, or profiled from the disclosed (obfuscated)
data. Designing such techniques is a research problem on its
own (for each type); we leave it to future work together with
the evaluation of the privacy implications of data obfuscation.
C. Contextual Information
For each permission decision, using standard Android API
calls, SmarPer collects the associated contextual information.
Using this information, we selected raw contextual features
that we estimated have an impact on users’ permission de-
cisions. This list is not exhaustive: There could be other
5Microsoft’s Face and Emotion APIs, https://www.microsoft.com/
cognitive-services/. Last visited: Feb. 2017.
Fig. 2. SmarPer permission prompt. The Weather Channel app
requests access to the user’s location. Clicking on the question mark
shows information about the effect of the different decision types.
Below that, we can see the semantic location and decision buttons.
important contextual features. In Section VI, we show a subset
of the most relevant features across all participants.
In total, we selected 32 raw features for our
machine learning analysis (Section VI):
• App information (6): UID, GID, package name, name,
version, and Google Play Store category.
• Foreground app information (3): package name, name,
and activity.
• Request information (4): XPrivacy category, method
name, parameters, whether it is dangerous (i.e., denying
it may break the app).
• Decision information (4): type, current time, time to make
the decision, and whether the decision has been modified
by the user.
• Device status (14): screen in interactive mode, screen
locked, ringer state, headphones plugged, headphone
type, headphones with a mic, battery percent, charging
state, charger type, network connection type, dock state,
latitude, longitude, and location provider.
• Semantic location (1): users are asked to choose a la-
bel for their current geographical location. For usability
purposes, only four labels are used (see Figure 2).
D. Data Collection Considerations
The purpose of our current SmarPer implementation is to
collect at runtime users’ permission decisions (Section V).
We want to collect as many users’ decisions as possible but
not to overwhelm users or cause habituation to the prompts
(Figure 2). Otherwise, we could end up with noisy and unre-
liable data. To address these issues, we added the following
mechanisms to SmarPer:
Prompt rate-limiting: As previous work [2] and our eval-
uation shows, most apps make a large number of requests for
users’ data. Hence, it is not practical to prompt users each
time an app makes a request. To address this problem, we
implemented the following rate-limiting policy for the apps
and data types targeted in our study (Section V). If the user is
using the app (i.e., foreground app), SmarPer does not limit
the number of prompts associated with this app. If the user is
not using with the app (i.e., background app), SmarPer only
permits one prompt every 10 to 20 minutes, sampled uniformly
from that interval. If the rate limit has been exceeded, SmarPer
takes the most recent decision for the same type of request. If
no previous decision exists, SmarPer prompts the user. Also,
SmarPer caches each decision for one hour to avoid prompting
repeatedly for the same type of request. If the user is not
using the smartphone, SmarPer applies the previous decision;
otherwise, SmarPer allows the request. Requests associated
with apps and data types not in our list are always accepted.
Non-interruption policy: For some activities (e.g., typing,
calling, taking a photo), it is better to not interrupt users
with prompts, as it can be problematic and lead to noisy
data. Hence, SmarPer does not interrupt the user in such
situations; instead, it uses the previous decision for the same
type of request. If there is no previous decision, the request
is allowed. SmarPer checks if the user is calling using the
TelephonyManager API or if the user is typing or taking a
picture by intercepting API calls such as InputMethodMan-
ager.showSoftInput(), Camera.open(), and Camera.release().
V. COLLECTING PERMISSION DECISIONS
To support automatic decisions in SmarPer, we need data
on how users make permission decisions at runtime and the
contextual information associated with such decisions. This
data is used to train a machine learning model that captures
the permission-decision patterns of each user (Section VI).
Unfortunately, data sets from previous works do not satisfy
our requirements. For example, they do not include runtime
permission decisions [8], [30]. Other data sets include runtime
decisions but were collected in non-realistic scenarios [2],
[10]. Initially, we considered using the data set from Wije-
sekera et al. [2], as it seemed to match our requirements.
But, we determined it was not appropriate for our goals, as
participants’ decisions were collected offline during an exit
interview (i.e., the context at request time is different from
the one at decision time), and the number of decisions per
participant is limited (i.e., 10-15 decisions per participant)
for training a machine learning model per participant. Hence,
we decided to conduct a data-collection campaign using our
partial SmarPer implementation and build our own data set.
Besides the technical requirements, a key challenge for our
data-collection was to gather, in a limited period of time,
enough data for our machine learning analysis without over-
whelming users with prompts or causing prompt habituation.
Moreover, the data collected can be very sparse [8], given
the great variety of apps, permissions, and contextual infor-
mation available. Hence, besides the mechanisms described in
Section IV, we also decided to collect decisions from only
a subset of apps and data types. We chose a set of popular
apps from the US Google Play Store that belong to different
categories and make requests for at least one of the following
data types: location, contacts, and storage. By using popular
apps, we increased the chance of (1) collecting more decision-
data from each app during the study (i.e., popular apps are
used more often), and (2) having more than one participant
using each app (to facilitate comparisons). This resulted in a
total of 29 apps: Accuweather, Amazon, Candy Crush Soda
Saga, Clash of Clans, Dropbox, Evernote, Facebook, Fitbit,
iHeartRadio, Instagram, Kik, Lyft, Runtastic, Shazam, Skype,
Snapchat, Soundcloud, Star Wars: Galaxy of Heroes, Subway
Surfers, The Weather Channel, TripAdvisor, Twitter, Uber,
Viber, Walmart, Waze, WhatsApp, Wish, and Yelp.
A. Methodology
Here, we describe the steps in our data-collection campaign.
It is important to note that the data collected contains
no personally identifiable information of the participants
and that our study was approved by our institution’s IRB
(i.e., ethical committee). In addition, all the data collected
is securely stored and can only be accessed by authorized
researchers from our institution.
1) Recruitment: We recruited remote and local participants
through posts on online forums and flyers on our campus.
Participants were required to be at least 18 years old, be regular
Android users, be regular users of at least two of the apps
selected for our study, and have reliable cellular and WiFi
Internet connectivity. We offered a $50 gift card as a reward.
2) Setup, Training, and Entry Survey: Both local and
remote participants had access to SmarPer’s training material
(e.g., written instructions and video tutorials) hosted in our
server. Before starting the study, participants had to agree
to our consent form and complete an entry survey. In this
survey, we asked participants some demographic questions
and some questions to estimate their general level of privacy
concerns. We made use of the IUIPC scale [43], as well
as some questions of our own design, adapted to the smart-
phone environment. Remote participants used their personal,
SmarPer-compatible smartphones (i.e., rooted Android 4.0.3-
5.x devices). Local participants had the option of using their
personal devices or using a smartphone provided by us,
notably Motorola Moto G 2nd or 3rd generation devices with
Android 4.4.5. In the latter case, to guarantee normal use
patterns, local participants met with one of our researchers
to set up the loaned device: transfer the participant’s SIM
card and data, and install the participant’s apps. We also asked
participants to treat the loaned smartphones as their personal
devices. This step is thus similar to the one followed by
Wijesekera et al. [2]. In total, we loaned smartphones to 29
participants. We also explained to participants the functioning
of SmarPer, in particular, the effect that the three decision
types have on the targeted data types and their purpose, i.e.,
data minimization.
It is possible that our SmarPer training influenced partici-
pants towards a more privacy-preserving behavior. Such bias
is difficult to avoid when evaluating a privacy mechanism
with real users. We cannot properly evaluate SmarPer without
first explaining concepts such as permission prompts and data
obfuscation. Nevertheless, such bias is unlikely to affect our
analysis, as our goal is not to estimate if SmarPer makes
participants more privacy-conscious. Instead, our goal is to
model participants’ unique privacy preferences when prompted
for permissions in different contexts (even if there is a bias)
and their attitudes towards obfuscation. Our scenario is similar
to the one of runtime permission-prompts in Android 6+ and
iOS, where users are explained first how permission prompts
work and their purpose.
3) Data-collection: Participants agreed to run SmarPer on
their personal or loaned smartphones for at least 10 days. Dur-
ing that period, SmarPer prompted participants for permission
decisions (Figure 2) associated with our selected apps and
data types. The goal was to collect at least 75 decisions per
participant and the contextual information associated with each
decision. If this targeted number of decisions was not reached
after 10 days, participants were encouraged to continue the
study for some additional time until it was reached (to avoid
bias, we did not explicitly ask participants for more decisions).
Every day, the decision data was automatically uploaded to
our server over an encrypted connection. Hence, we were also
able to monitor for problems with SmarPer or if users were not
actively using the smartphone. In the latter case, we contacted
the participants to remind them about the rules.
4) Static Policies and Exit Surveys: At the end of the
data-collection, all participants were required to complete
two additional surveys. In the static policy survey, for each
app monitored during the study, we asked the participant to
define what static decision (i.e., allow, obfuscate, deny) they
would grant to access each of the monitored data types (i.e.,
location, contacts, storage). The purpose of this survey is
to capture how participants would configure permissions on
their personal smartphones by using the interface provided by
current permission systems (e.g., Android 6+). The data from
this survey was used as a baseline in our analysis (Section VI).
In the exit survey, we asked participants about their experi-
ence with SmarPer and their aptitudes towards using automatic
decisions, data obfuscation, and contextual information in
mobile permissions. We conducted supplementary interviews
with selected participants to better understand the reasons
for their decisions during the study. After completing both
surveys and passing the data consistency check (described
next), participants were rewarded with a gift card.
5) Data Quality: We performed different checks to validate
the quality of the data submitted by participants. First, we
checked that participants did not respond to prompts too
rapidly, i.e., at least two seconds elapsed before they chose
their response. The fact that participants had to touch the
screen twice per prompt (Figure 2) reduced the chances of
quick random decisions. Second, we checked the consistency
of the semantic locations reported by the participants, by
comparing the semantic labels with the actual coordinates
recorded at decision time. For example, if a participant re-
ported “home” in two or more geographical locations, it is
likely that the participant provided false information. No users
violated the above conditions significantly enough to warrant
being removed from the study. Third, for each participant, we
removed the first and last five decisions from the data set, as
they were made during the familiarization with SmarPer and
when participants returned the loaned devices, i.e., noisy data.
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Fig. 3. Total number of decisions per participant, including the distribution of the decision types. The difference in the number of decisions
is mostly due to the participant’s behavior, number and type of apps used, and days in the study.
6) Data Preprocessing: We converted some of the raw con-
textual features (Section IV-C) before our machine learning
analysis (Section VI). First, categorical features (e.g., app
name and category) were converted into dummy features [44],
because techniques, such as linear regression, do not work
directly with categorical features. These dummy variables
take the value 0 or 1 to indicate the absence or presence of
some categorical effect. Second, we computed five additional
features based on the raw features collected: whether an app
is in the foreground, day of week, part of day (i.e., morning,
afternoon, evening, night), battery charge percentage, and
day/month/year. We ended up with a total of 37 features.
B. Data Set Details
A total of 47 participants joined our data-collection cam-
paign; 41 completed it successfully. Overall, we collected
around 4.82 million apps’ requests for private information. Of
these, we prompted participants for 8,521 manual permission
decisions. The rest corresponds to requests associated with
apps and data types outside the scope of our study.
1) Demographics: From the 41 participants that completed
the study: 17 (41%) were female; 29 (71%) were in the 18–25
range and 12 (29%) were in the 26–50 range; 12 (29.3%) were
undergraduate students, 23 (56.1%) were graduate students,
3 (7.3%) worked in scientific services, 1 (2.4%) worked in
education, 1 was unemployed, and 1 did not disclose their
occupation. Participants reported being active smartphones
users (1-3 hours/day) and long-term Android users (2-5 years).
In the entry survey, participants scored high on a 5-
point IUIPC scale for control, awareness, and collection of
private information. These results indicate that most of our
participants have a high level of privacy concern. Participants
reported high concern regarding apps accessing their contacts,
camera, or storage. Surprisingly, participants were less con-
cerned about apps accessing their location.
2) Exploratory Analysis: In our final data set, allow, obfus-
cate, and deny account for 42%, 27%, and 31% of the total
number of decisions, respectively, thus showing a balanced
distribution of decision types. Figure 3 shows the total number
of permission decisions per user, including the distribution
of decision types. Participants chose for contacts: 65% allow,
24% obfuscate, and 11% deny; for location: 25% allow, 27%
obfuscate, and 48% deny, and for storage: 35% allow, 31%
obfuscate and 34% deny. We conclude that participants are
more likely to allow contacts and deny location requests. These
results contradict the concern levels reported by participants
in the entry survey (Section V-B1), where they stated to be
more concerned about apps accessing their contacts than their
location (i.e., “privacy paradox” [45]).
In Figure 3 we also notice that some participants were
significantly more active than others. This difference is due
mainly to the participant’s individual behavior, the number and
type of apps used, and the number of days in the study (66%
of the participants completed the data collection in less than
15 days). Participants were prompted a median of 17.3 times
per day and each prompt was completed in a few seconds.
These numbers show the effectiveness of our rate-limiting
mechanisms (Section IV-D). For comparison, participants in
[10] were prompted at least 10 times a day and each prompt
required 2-5 minutes to complete. We observe that the distribu-
tion of decision types varies considerably across participants,
indicating the unique privacy preferences of each user and
hinting at the difficulty of predicting permission decisions.
Figure 4 shows this difference more clearly by depicting the
initial, middle, and last 12 decisions of a subset of participants.
We observe that the distributions are reasonably stable over
time per participant, especially after some initial period where
some participants changed their preferences. Participants are
vertically grouped according to their privacy profile: utility-
concerned (top), somewhat-privacy-concerned (middle), and
privacy-concerned (bottom).
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Fig. 4. Decision patterns over time for a subset of participants and
decisions. Each row shows the first, middle, and last 12 decisions of
each participant. We can observe the different privacy behavior of
participants. Participants are grouped vertically in three categories:
utility-concerned (top), somewhat-privacy-concerned (middle), and
privacy-concerned (bottom) participants.
On average, participants used 4.2(±2.0) apps from our list
of apps. In our data set we have data from 23 apps out of 29
in our list. Note that the fact that participants used a small
number of apps is beneficial for our analysis, as it enabled us
to collect more decision data per used app during the study,
hence reducing data sparsity. Figure 5 shows apps with more
than 10 decisions and more than 1 participant. We can see
that the three most popular apps are WhatsApp, Facebook,
and Skype with 36, 33, and 19 participants, respectively. The
difference in the number of decisions is due not only to the
number of participants per app, but also to the type of app
and how active each participant was. More details about the
number of decisions per app are shown in Table II (Appendix).
VI. DATA ANALYSIS: PREDICTING DECISIONS
In this section, we present the machine learning analysis
of our data set. We describe and compare various methods
for context-aware and automatic permissions. Our goal is to
predict users’ preferred privacy levels for a new permission
prompt, given their past decisions and associated context.
A. Problem Statement
We index users by u and permission requests by i and j.
We denote user u’s decision for the i’th permission request
by yui ∈ {“Allow”, “Obfuscate”, “Deny”}. We denote the
context of the permission request by a feature-vector xui ∈
X ⊂ RD and the time the request was made by tui. We denote
the user’s past data before time t by Du,t to be the set of all
decision pairs {yui,xui} made at time ti < tu. Our goal is
the following: given a user’s past decisions Du,t, predict the
users’ decision y∗ at a future time given a feature vector x∗.
We focus on two important aspects: (1) we can learn to
predict permission decisions, (2) context helps us to do so.
We also show that, as the amount of data per user increases
(i.e., a higher tu), our predictions improve much faster when
we take context into account.
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Fig. 5. Total number of decisions and participants (in parentheses)
for apps with more than 10 decisions and more than 1 participant,
including the distribution of the decision types. The difference in the
number of decisions is due to the type and the popularity of the app.
B. Baselines
We use the following two baselines. The first baseline is
referred to as the static policy method based on a survey com-
pleted by all participants (Section V-A4). Decisions collected
in this survey are used as fixed predictions for permission
requests. Over time, this method does not learn users’ prefer-
ences and only takes part of the contextual information into
account (i.e., apps’ names and targeted data types). We expect
this method to perform worse than a dynamic method that
learns from users’ behavior. This method approximates the
current permission systems in Android 6+ and iOS.
Our second baseline ignores contextual information but
learns the preference function from past data. We simply
predict the most frequent decision made by the user until time
tu for all the new decisions. This method, although dynamic,
might miss the contextual information associated with some
decisions and might perform worse than a method that takes
the context into account. We call this method ZeroRt, because
it is an extension of the ZeroR classifier [46].
C. Context-Aware Method
We compare our baselines to a method that learns from
users’ behavior and uses contextual information to predict. We
model privacy preferences of the user u by a one-dimensional
privacy-preference function fu : X → R. Given a feature
vector x ∈ X , the value of function fu(x) indicates a degree of
privacy: a higher value indicates higher desire for privacy. The
prediction is made by thresholding the preference function:
yui =


“Deny”, when θ1 < fu(xi)
“Obfuscate”, θ2 < fu(xi) ≤ θ1
“Allow”, fu(xi) ≤ θ2
(1)
where θ1 and θ2 are two real-valued scalars. This is an
example of the Random Utility Model and has been widely
used to model users’ preference functions (see [47]).
We use Bayesian linear regression (BLR) to model the
preference function given the contextual information. The
simplest model is to use a linear function:
fu(x) = β
0
u + β
T
ux+ ǫui, (2)
where β0u ∈ R, βu ∈ R
D, and ǫui is the noise. We model both
βu and the noise ǫui as i.i.d. Gaussian random variables.
Using the Bayes rule, we can compute the posterior distri-
bution over predictions. However, the nonlinear function of (1)
complicates this computation because it is not Gaussian. To
simplify the computation, we make the following relaxation
to (1): we fix thresholds6 θ1 = 0.5 and θ2 = −0.5 and
recode the decisions {“Allow”, “Obfuscate”, and “Deny”} as
{−1, 0,+1}. This makes the decision yui Gaussian and then
we can compute the posterior distribution in closed-form by
using the Bayes rule. The BLR model outputs a real-value
yˆ which we threshold at θ1 and θ2 according to (1) to get
the discrete-valued decision. The formulation presented in (1)
and (2) enables us to use nonlinear models for fu by using
Gaussian Process models (GP). By simply changing the kernel
matrix used, we can obtain a variety of nonlinear models
(see Chapter 2 in [48]). This approach is similar to SVM
algorithms, used in previous works [2], [8], with one important
difference: the GP model gives us posterior probabilities for
our predictions, unlike SVM where we need a two-stage
procedure that requires large data to avoid overfitting (see
Chapter 7 in [49]).
We note that our approach, BLR, differs from previous
works that use only two classes “allow” and “deny” [2], [8].
For a two-class problem, the ordering does not matter, but for
our problem it is clear that “obfuscate” requires less privacy
than “deny” but more privacy than “allow”. Therefore, the
choice of a one-dimensional function is justified, although
this approach can be easily extended to a multi-dimensional
function [50]. Another alternative would be to use multi-
class classification (e.g., support-vector machines, classifica-
tion trees), along with a cost-sensitive cost function [51]. Still,
BLR is a reasonable first choice for small data sets, given its
simplicity.
D. Error Measure
To reliably compare methods, we propose the performance
error measure E to evaluate the performance of a method M:
EtM(D,Dtest) :=
1
U
U∑
u=1
1
Nu
Nu∑
i=1
L(yui, yˆui|t) (3)
6In practice, these thresholds should be learned from the data.
where L is a loss function, Dtest is the set of test decisions
yui for users u = 1, . . . , U , D is the set of past decisions and
contextual information Du,t for these users, Nu is the number
test decisions in Du,t, and yˆui|t are predictions computed by
using Du,t and the method M. Note that the error measure
is a random variable which depends on the choice of users
in the test data and the data that contains the past decisions.
This loss function is averaged over many users, therefore it
penalizes methods that do not generalize well to many users
at the same time. This is a better error measure than using
one-leave-out methods that might show a high variance for
different trials, as different users are selected in different runs.
We will use two types of loss functions. The first loss
function is the popular 0-1 loss: L(y, y′) = 1 when y 6= y′
and 0 when y = y′. In this case, E is the standard incorrect
classification rate metric (ICR). However, the 0-1 loss ignores
the ordering between the three categories of the decision y:
e.g., if we predict “allow” for “deny”, then it is more incorrect
than predicting “obfuscate”, as the latter allows some degree
of privacy. We use another loss function called mean-absolute
error (MAE) that reflects these types of errors. We recode the
decisions {“Allow”, “Obfuscate”, “Deny”} as {−1, 0,+1} and
we define the loss as follows: L(y, y′) = |y − y′|.
E. Performance Evaluation Methodology
We developed a machine learning framework to reliably
estimate the error measure for different methods. Our frame-
work uses the standard splitting of the data into training and
testing sets. We randomly select 50% of the participants for
testing (U = 20) to compute an estimate of the error, and the
remaining 21 participants for training to learn the parameters
for the BLR model by maximizing the log-likelihood. Note
that, for baseline and other methods evaluated, there are no
parameters to learn.
On the 20 test participants, we estimate the error measure
as follows. We first form datasets Du,tu for each participant.
As participants have varied number of decisions, we select
a fixed percentage of each participant’s data, e.g., for each
participant, we can select the first 10% of their decisions, that
we denote by tu = 10%, ∀u. We then form the dataset Dtest
by randomly selecting Nu = 20 decisions
7 as test decisions
yui for each participant. Using the method M, we compute
predictions yˆ
ui|Dt,u for all yui ∈ Dtest. We choose only those
decisions as test points that were made after the first half of
the decisions so that the test decisions resemble decisions that
the participant has to make in the far future. We repeat the
above splitting process 50 times with different random seeds
to get 50 different realizations of the error.
For our evaluation, we use features chosen using an additive
approach, also known as Forward Stepwise Selection [52].
We add each of the 37 features (Sections IV-C and V-A6)
in turn, and observe their effect on the model’s performance.
The feature that most improves performance is selected. We
7Some participants do not have more than 75 decisions, hence choosing 20
test decisions (around 30% of their data) allow us to include them.
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Fig. 6. Performance results for the machine learning models evaluated in our study. (a) and (b) show estimates of error measures as a function
of tu which is varied from 10% to 100%. (a) is obtained by using the 0-1 loss and reports ICR, while (b) is obtained by using MAE. In each
plot, thick lines (with markers on them) show the median of the error, while the shaded region behind shows the error between 25th and
75th percentile. Models that consider contextual information have significantly lower error than our context-oblivious baselines. Moreover,
per-user models outperform one-size-fits-all models, i.e., BLR-all and SVM-all. (c) shows the histogram of MAE over test decisions in Dtest
for one random partition and tu = 100%. Context-aware methods make very few mistakes with a loss of 2, which clearly shows that such
methods rarely make the mistake of predicting “allow” for “deny” and vice versa.
repeat the procedure to find the second most important feature,
and so on. We continue this procedure until the performance
remains the same or decreases, as shown in Figure 8 for BLR.
Using this approach, we selected the following seven features
for BLR: method category (i.e., location, contacts, or storage),
method name (i.e., the actual API call), app name, whether the
app was in the foreground, whether denying the request causes
the app to crash, day of month, and battery-level percentage.
Note that the effect on performance of a set of features will
depend on the machine learning model selected. This is not
necessarily the best subset and combination of features for
BLR, as our selection approach was not exhaustive; the best
subset and combination of features may vary across partici-
pants. For BLR, a possible approach is to use regularization
to find the best features, which also helps reducing overfitting.
In our evaluation, we use data from all the participants,
but only for decisions associated with popular apps, i.e., apps
with more than 200 decisions (Figure 5): Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, Snapchat, The Weather
Channel, and AccuWeather. We do so because we do not have
enough data for the remaining apps to reliably perform our
analysis (see Table II in the Appendix).
Our experimental framework and the models evaluated (see
next section) were implemented by using the Matlab Statistics
and Machine Learning toolbox, and the GPML toolbox [53].
Our code is publicly available in the SmarPer’s website [11].
F. Performance Evaluation Results
In our evaluation, we considered the following models:
static policy, ZeroRt, BLR, Gaussian Process with Squared
Exponential Kernel (GP-SE), decision tree (D. Tree), and 3-
binary support vector machines (SVM) with linear kernel. The
goal was to compare context-oblivious models with different
context-aware models. We also evaluated the training of one-
size-fits-all models (i.e., BLR-all and SVM-all), i.e., training
a single model for all users.
Figure 6 shows estimates of error measures as a function
of tu. We vary tu from 10% to 100% for all test participants.
Figure 6(a) is obtained by using 0-1 loss function and shows
the median of the ICR obtained by the different models
evaluated. The shaded area shows the region between 25th
and 75th percentile. We can observe that both one-size-fits-all
models (i.e., BLR-all and SVM-all) have a significantly higher
error rate than most per-user models; BLR-all performs even
worse than our baselines. These results are consistent with
our observations about Figure 3, participants’ unique privacy
preferences make it difficult to train a one-size-fits-all model
that accurately predicts decisions at runtime. For tu = 100%,
the mean ICR is 0.39 (±0.04) for static policy, 0.30 (±0.03)
for ZeroRt, 0.20 (±0.03) for BLR, and 0.16 (±0.02) for SVM.
We can see that context-aware models obtain a much lower
error-rate than the baselines, which clearly shows the gain
obtained after adding context. Also note that, unlike the static
policy method, all the other per-user models are dynamic and
learn to predict better as the amount of data is increased.
In addition, note that BLR, SVM, GP-SE and D. Tree have
roughly similar performance. Still, BLR can be considered a
safer option, due to its simplicity, i.e., lower risk of overfitting
and computational overhead [54].
Figure 6(b) shows a similar trend for MAE loss. For
tu = 100%, the mean MAE was 0.48 (±0.06) for static policy,
0.39 (±0.04) for ZeroRt, 0.22 (±0.03) for BLR, and 0.19
(±0.03) for SVM. To put these numbers in perspective, note
that the MAE is in the range [0,2]. The gains obtained with our
context-aware methods are even larger here because the MAE
loss function captures the ordering between different types
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the individual performance on 20 participants
for one random partition and tu = 100%. We plot MAE obtained by
the baselines and a SVM versus those obtained by our BLR model.
Each point corresponds to the MAE of a participant estimated using
(3) with Nu = 20 and U = 1. Note that not all the points are visible
due to the plot’s scale. A thin grey line joins the MAEs obtained on
the same participant. A point above the dashed grey line indicates
that the corresponding baseline gives worse performance than our
method, which is the case for most participants. Also, we can see
that SVM and BLR have comparable performances.
of decisions, which is ignored by the 0-1 loss. For example,
MAE penalizes decisions according to the degree of privacy
violation, i.e., predicting “allow” for “deny” has a loss of 2
compared to predicting “obfuscate” which has a loss of 1.
Under 0-1 loss these errors are treated equally with a loss of
1. Thus, MAE is a better measure of the loss for our problem.
Although we believe our results are quite encouraging (more
than 80% of correct predictions for modest training set sizes,
hence lower user burden), the level of user satisfaction for such
values of the performance metric must be evaluated through
dedicated experiments and user studies, which will be carried
out in the second phase of the project.
Furthermore, we show in Figure 6(c) the distribution of
MAE over test decisions in Dtest for one random partition
with tu = 100%, i.e., all the training data. Context-aware
methods such as BLR and SVM have very few mistakes with
a loss of 2, which clearly shows that such methods very rarely
make the mistake of predicting “allow” for “deny” and vice
versa (see Section VII-C for more details about the impact of
such mistakes). Again, there is little difference between the
results for BLR and SVM.
The sensitivity of MAE to different types of decisions is
also reflected in the worse performance of ZeroRt in Figure
6(a) compared to its performance in Figure 6(b). ZeroRt has
many predictions with MAE of 2; they are ignored under the
0-1 loss but not under the MAE loss, which is why ZeroRt
performs worse with the latter. In contrast, our context-aware
methods perform similarly under both loss functions.
Figure 7 compares the individual performances on 20 par-
ticipants for one random partition and tu = 100%. We plot
MAE losses obtained by the baselines and SVM versus those
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Fig. 8. Importance of individual contextual features for prediction.
We show box-plots of MAE obtained for 50 different partitions with
tu = 100%. The top two box-plots are for the baselines, and the
next four are for BLR models using only one feature. Even with one
feature containing a single context regarding the app being in the
foreground or background, BLR outperforms the baselines. The last
two box-plots use all four features and all 37 features, respectively,
where we see that BLR with the four features performs slightly better.
For the details of features, see Sections IV-C and V-A6.
obtained by BLR. Each point corresponds to the MAE of a
participant estimated using (3) with Nu = 20 and U = 1.
The MAE of the static policy method, ZeroRt and SVM
methods are shown by crosses, circles, and dots, respectively.
A thin grey line joins the two MAEs obtained on the same
participant. A point above the dashed grey line indicates
that the corresponding baseline gives worse performance than
BLR, which is the case for most participants. Among the
baselines there is no clear winner. Similarly, there is no clear
winner between BLR and SVM. Note that these MAE values
are less stable as they are estimated with only 20 points. For
many participants, standard errors are in the order of 0.1. The
numbers reported in Figure 6 are more stable and reliable
since they are estimated with a large number of test decisions
(20 participants with 20 test decisions each giving us a total
of 400 points). Nevertheless, Figure 7 shows that even across
participants adding context improves the performance.
Also, note that in Figure 7 the variance across participants
is quite high. We can predict some participants very well
(MAE is close to zero), whereas for others MAE could be
as high as 0.7. The aggregate over participants however is
quite satisfactory, e.g., in Figure 6(c) where each participant
is equally represented (each participant contributes 20 test
decisions in the histogram). For the participants we cannot
predict well, possible reasons are that more data is needed or
that they were not consistent in their decisions.
Figure 8 explores the importance of individual features
for prediction. We show box-plots of MAE obtained for 50
different partitions with tu = 100%. The top two box-plots
are for static policy and ZeroRt, respectively. The next four
box-plots show the performance of BLR obtained after adding
only one feature out of the following four features: (A) the
name of the app requesting permission, (B) the method of the
request, i.e., the actual API call, (C) the method category, i.e.,
contacts, location, or storage, and (D) whether the requesting
app was in the foreground. Even with just one feature, we
obtain improvements over the baselines that use (almost) no
contextual information at all. The most striking among these
features is the feature D (regarding the app being in the
foreground or not) which obtains a much lower median error
of 0.25 compared to the baselines. The 7th box-plot shows
the performance obtained with all the 4 features (A+B+C+D)
which achieves a slightly lower and robust MAEs compared
to the last box-plot which shows performance when all 37
features are used. This type of behavior is expected when the
sample-size is small which is the case here.
G. Computational Performance
Our chosen machine learning model, BLR, is simple enough
to run on smartphones. To evaluate its computational perfor-
mance, we used a Motorola Moto G 3rd generation smart-
phone with Android 5.1.1, 7 contextual features, 5-fold cross-
validation, and around 200 decisions from a single participant.
We ported our BLR algorithm to Android using the Efficient
Java Matrix Library (EJML) [55]. With this setup, training
took around 1.32±0.31 s and prediction 50±6 µs, and the CPU
usage was not higher than 50%. These results show that our
approach is feasible in smartphones, particularly if we take into
account that training does not need to happen frequently (e.g.,
a couple of times during the day). Moreover, training can be
done while the smartphone is idly charging to avoid draining
the battery or interfering with apps. In future work, we also
plan to evaluate BLR with sequential updating (i.e., online
learning), by using one rank update of the Cholesky factor
or stochastic gradient descent. Such approach should reduce
training time significantly. In addition, we estimated the
impact on performance of our SmarPer prototype, particularly
the service that collects context information and intercepts
apps’ requests. Using OS and third-party tools, we did not
measure a significant impact on CPU usage from our service.
Regarding battery life, we used Android’s Battery monitor API
to measure if using SmarPer drained the battery faster, but we
did not measure a significant difference on battery life between
a smartphone with and without SmarPer. Moreover, none of
the participants reported problems with battery life.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we present further discussion of the results
obtained in our data-collection and machine learning analysis,
as well as deployment considerations for SmarPer.
A. Amount of Training Data vs Model Complexity
Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show that the MAE and ICR for our
BLR model continue to decrease by the end of the experiment,
i.e., tu = 100%. Thus, the performance of our model can be
further improved with more data. In contrast, for ZeroRt, they
flatten out around tu = 80%, hence, more decision data may
not help improving the performance of ZeroRt.
As there is a wide variance in users’ preferences, it is
recommended to collect data from a sufficiently large number
of users. The number of decisions per user depends on the
type of their preferences as well as on the dimensionality of
the contextual features. A larger amount of training data will
enable the application of advanced machine learning models
that can capture the wide variance in the privacy preferences,
for example, a topic model can represent a user as a mixture of
several types of privacy preferences and is likely to be much
more accurate [56]. In short, the amount of training data and
time required to train an accurate model depend on the user
and their willingness to provide decision data.
In our experiments, we did try several non-linear models
that are based on Gaussian process regression (GP-SE), as
well as a SVM and decision tree models. These models only
marginally improved the performance over a linear model
(Figures 6(a) and 6(b)), suggesting that the amount of data
is perhaps not enough for training more complex models. On
41 users with 8,521 decisions with 37 contextual features, a
linear model worked the best. As a next step, we plan to
collect additional decision data and to evaluate more advanced
machine learning models to improve prediction accuracy.
B. Automating Permission Decisions
We ran several experiments to evaluate how our BLR model
predicts and automates decisions to reduce users’ overhead,
i.e., the number of prompts to answer. For this purpose, we
estimated the confidence of our model on each decision (using
the mean and variance) and defined different thresholds to
decide whether to automate the decision or prompt the user.
However, as stated before, we did not have enough data to
reach concrete conclusions. Moreover, we face the challenge
of determining when the model is accurate enough to start
automating decisions. On the one hand, our model needs as
much decision data as possible to improve its performance, but
on the other hand, once our model starts automating decisions,
it will obtain less decision data.
The simplest approach is to make decision prompts ran-
domly and limit the number of requests per day. In our
experiments, this works reasonably, although we found that
ultimately using all the data gives the best results. This implies
that all of our data are useful for prediction. This also implies
that, in practice, an automatic system might collect a few
responses each day until enough decisions have been collected.
We could follow the approach used in our data collection
phase, i.e., to prompt users a limited number of times per day
to collect data to train our model, and to rely on user-defined
static policies for other requests. To collect enough decisions
per app and reduce the risks of overwhelming the user, we
recommend to start collecting data only for a subset of apps
selected by the user (e.g., most used apps); gradually, other
apps can be added to the system. Another option, is to profit
from the data from similar users to accelerate the learning
process, i.e., user profiles. However, the system first needs to
learn the various types of preferences. Once we have data from
a sufficient number of users and apps, we will be able to map a
new user to a particular profile and start automating decisions
for certain requests instead of relying on static policies. As
mentioned before, our data set does not contain enough users
to identify profiles via clustering.
Using our machine learning framework, we could regularly
train and test our model to monitor its performance (e.g., once
a day). If the MAE is lower than a defined threshold (function
c(), see Section III-C), the decisions are made automatically,
using the learned model. To keep the model updated, we
can follow an exploration-exploitation trade-off [57], where
we prompt the user for more decision data at a rate that is
an increasing function of the current estimation of the MAE
(i.e., the higher the estimated error, the higher the prompt
rate). Thus, the decision on a request would depend both on
the current estimate of the user’s preference and on random
explorations, i.e., the mean can be used to exploit and the
variance to explore. These learning methods are popular in
machine learning and are useful for automating decisions.
The acceptable MAE is a user-dependent value and can
be estimated only via a long-term study and/or interviews. If
the decisions are balanced across allow, obfuscate, and deny,
predicting obfuscate all the time would give an MAE of 0.66.
We could suggest some reasonable values (e.g., 0.20), but the
user must decide which value is acceptable.
Moreover, as discussed in Section III, SmarPer includes
an audit function for correcting incorrect automatic decisions.
Such corrected decisions are added to the training set, po-
tentially with higher weights, to prevent the system from
repeating the same errors. This feature was not evaluated in
our first study, as no automatic decisions were made during the
experiment; but it will be in the second phase of the project. As
for the adoption of the audit feature, we observed during the
study that participants fixed their own incorrect decisions: For
instance, when participants realize that one of their decisions
breaks the app functionality, they clear SmarPer’s decision
cache and restart the app. Such behavior suggests that the
audit feature would be used by users.
Overall, our user survey shows that participants are in-
terested in automatic decisions. For instance, 66% of our
participants reported that they will trust a system that makes
automatic permission decisions on their behalf. In addition,
88% said they would be “very interested” or “interested” to
see a feature like SmarPer in a new version of Android.
The second phase of the SmarPer project, on which we are
currently working, will enable us to evaluate our approach
and the user perception with respect to automating decisions
(accuracy, frequency and adequacy of the prompts, sensitivity
to prediction errors, i.e., determining what is an acceptable
value for the MAE and the user preferences with respect
to undersharing vs. oversharing) and the use of SmarPer’s
features, such as the audit option.
C. Impact of Predicting Permission Decisions
SmarPer’s purpose is to learn and emulate users’ privacy
behaviors. That is, if a user tends to put her privacy at risk by
sharing large amounts of information, the trained model will
do the same. Problems arise if the predicted decision does not
match the user’s intent. First, if the model predicts “allow”,
instead of “deny”, sensitive information will be revealed to
apps, i.e., privacy loss due to oversharing. Second, if the model
predicts “deny”, instead of “allow”, the app will not work as
the user expects, i.e., utility loss due to undersharing. Third, if
the model predicts “obfuscate”, instead of “deny” or “allow”,
some privacy or utility loss occurs, depending on the scenario
(data type), i.e., partial-oversharing or partial-undersharing.
Note that, for all practical purposes, undersharing (and some
partial-undersharing) errors mean that an app will not longer
work because it was denied the permissions required for key
functionality. In some cases, an app could crash or behave
unexpectedly (see Section VII-D). Still, the chance of such
problems is low, now that Android supports disabling per-
missions (Android 6+), as most apps can gracefully handle
denied permissions. In short, SmarPer should be evaluated
with respect to its ability to mimic users’ decisions and to the
types of incorrect predictions.
As Figure 6 shows, BLR and SVM models rarely make large
mistakes predicting “allow” for “deny” and vice versa. More
specifically, BLR has an average per-user of 0.6±0.6% over-
sharing error, 9.4±1.9% partial-oversharing error, 8.8±1.8%
partial-undersharing error, and 0.8±0.5% under-sharing error.
In contrast, static policy (currently deployed approach) has an
average per-user of 7.1±2.6% oversharing error, 17.4±3.0%
partial-oversharing error, 11.5±3.2% partial-undersharing er-
ror, and 2.6±2.0% under-sharing error. As a result, we can see
that, compared with static policy, our approach significantly
reduces the loss of privacy and utility. Also, note that the
errors reported for our approach assume that all the predicted
decisions are automated. In practice, SmarPer will automate
only a subset of the predicted decisions based on the output
of the function c() (Section IIC). Hence, the errors should be
smaller. To reduce these errors further, we can also use cost-
sensitive training [50], where users can configure the kind of
errors to minimize (oversharing/undersharing), as in [28].
D. Data Obfuscation
Obfuscation was well-received by the participants. Over our
whole data set, 29% of decisions were obfuscate decisions.
A similar fraction was observed across data types: Users
obfuscated 25% of requests for contacts, 26% of requests for
location, and 32% of requests for storage. Moreover, in our
exit survey 73% of participants found obfuscation useful and
80% stated that they would like to obfuscate additional data
types. Still, some participants did not find obfuscation useful,
e.g., a few participants chose to always deny or always accept
apps’ requests. Also, a small number of participants reported
that obfuscation caused problems with certain apps, hence they
stopped using this option. It is also possible that, in spite of the
training provided, some participants did not fully understand
the purpose of obfuscation.
In our exit interviews, participants shared some use cases
for obfuscation: “For apps that need location, such as Ac-
cuweather, I was giving obfuscated access most of the time
as I expected the functionality to be fine with coarse grained
location.”–D69. Another participant explained the benefits of
obfuscation: “Even if we don’t want to give all the information
to the application used, we still have to give some, in order to
the application to be useful”–37F. See Table III (Appendix B).
Obfuscation may introduce unexpected behaviors in
apps [24]. In our field test, few participants reported non-
critical issues with obfuscation. For instance, some participants
reported that storage obfuscation interfered with apps that take
or edit photos (e.g., Twitter, Facebook), as they need to access
the pictures folder. Also, participants reported that WhatsApp
was not displaying contact name’s correctly when obfuscation
was chosen for contacts. Coordination with developers and
mobile platform providers is important to reduce these prob-
lems. For example, native APIs could be introduced to handle
obfuscated data types and handle possible runtime exceptions.
E. Privacy Benefits of a Per-User Model
Prior works aggregate permission preferences and related
information from all users to train a one-size-fits-all classi-
fier [2], [8] or to identify privacy profiles via clustering [8],
[9]. However, aggregating this information introduces privacy
risks, as it can be misused to infer sensitive information about
users. In SmarPer, we show that is feasible to train a model
per user directly in the user’s smartphone, i.e., no permission
information is sent to other parties. Note that in the case of
BLR, partial decision data from a subset of users is needed to
learn the model hyperparameters. However, instead of sending
raw decision data to a central location, users can send sufficient
statistics (e.g., expectation of β0u and β
T
u ) to defend against
inference attacks. More advanced models (e.g., SVMs) do not
need this (but might require more data for training).
F. Limitations
There are many challenges associated with predicting and
automating permission decisions at runtime using contextual
information. To provide some guidance to future works in
these area, we present the main limitations of our approach:
• Participant’s bias. Due to the nature of our evalua-
tion, participants might have some bias towards a more
privacy-preserving behavior and, in particular, towards
using obfuscation. Such bias is common in the evaluation
of privacy tools and is difficult to avoid. To reduce it, we
presented in a neutral way the decision options (allow,
obfuscate, deny) to participants during their training.
• Focus on popular apps. To obtain enough decision data
per app for our study, we collected data only from popular
apps. This might have introduced a bias, as participants
are more familiar with these apps and, in some cases, less
willing to deny their requests. Yet, collecting data from
a larger set of apps requires a long-term user study to
collect enough data from less frequently used apps. Also,
techniques to deal with data sparsity will be needed.
• Simplified decision modeling. Our prediction model takes
into account only contextual factors that can be col-
lected by the users’ smartphones. There are probably
other contextual factors that are also important but not
considered in our approach. Moreover, there are non-
contextual factors that are important in privacy decision-
making, e.g., psychological factors [20].
• Data set size. Our data set is not large enough to reli-
ably train advanced machine learning models, to cluster
participants, and to obtain a reliable confidence metric.
Hence, we will carry out a longer-term data collection
campaign with more participants.
• Data quality. We took measures to remove noisy decision
data from our data set (Section V). However, we cannot
fully validate if participants made decisions that correctly
conveyed their intentions. For instance, a participant
might have provided only biased or fake decisions, or
just random decisions. This could explain why some
participants are more difficult to predict.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the number of apps, data types, and permissions in-
creases in mobile platforms, users are increasingly in need
of better mechanisms to manage permissions. Artificial in-
telligence and machine learning techniques are already being
used for security purposes in mobile platforms such as An-
droid [58]. Therefore, it is logical to use similar techniques to
help users to better control their privacy in mobile devices.
We presented SmarPer, an advanced permission mechanism
for Android, designed to address two important limitations of
current mobile permission systems: the static nature of current
permission policies and the poor trade-off between privacy
and utility. After seeing some initial training decision data
and its corresponding contextual information, SmarPer uses
machine learning to infer users’ permission-decision patterns
at runtime and to automatically respond to future permission
requests (not yet supported). Furthermore, SmarPer offers
“obfuscated” decisions to reduce the information revealed to
apps while still obtaining some utility.
We deployed, under realistic conditions, our SmarPer imple-
mentation to 41 users and collected their permission decisions
and contextual information for around 10 days each. Using
a Bayesian linear regression approach to train a model per
user, we achieved a mean incorrect classification rate (ICR)
of 0.20 (±0.03), which is a mean relative improvement of
50% over a static policy baseline, i.e., the approach used by
current permission systems. Our results show that our model
can learn to predict users’ decisions with good accuracy and
that contextual information is important for such a task.
For future work, we plan to expand our data set of per-
mission decisions to train more advanced models for better
accuracy. Moreover, we will evaluate exploration-exploitation
trade-off methods to automate decisions at runtime to complete
our SmarPer implementation and to move a step closer towards
automatic permission-management in smartphones.
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APPENDIX A
DISTRIBUTION OF DECISIONS PER APP
Table II shows the total number of decisions per app
collected during our study (Section V). For each app, it also
shows the distribution of decisions per data type (i.e., contacts,
location, storage) and for each data type the distribution of the
type of decision (i.e., allow, obfuscate, deny). These numbers
demonstrate the importance of selecting popular apps in our
study to be able to collect enough decision data in the allotted
time; only 9 apps have more than 200 decisions. Hence, for
less popular apps or apps that are used less frequent, we need
longer periods of time to collect enough data (avoiding forcing
participants to generate decisions to reduce bias).
APPENDIX B
EXAMPLE SCENARIOS USED IN PERMISSION DECISIONS
After completing our data collection campaign, we sent
an e-mail to some of the participants with a questionnaire
inquiring about example situations in which they chose a
decision for a particular app and data type. Some of the
answers collected are presented in Table III. These responses
show the trade-off between privacy and usability that users
face when making permission decisions. These responses also
provide an idea of the scenarios or contexts that users consider
when making decisions.
Contacts Location Storage
App Total Count A O D Count A O D Count A O D
WhatsApp 2982 1246 871 257 118 460 103 105 252 1276 765 223 288
Facebook 1821 18 4 13 1 1007 180 186 641 796 171 269 356
The Weather Channel 878 0 0 0 0 311 120 112 79 567 66 170 331
Twitter 569 1 1 0 0 203 23 72 108 365 186 119 60
Viber 556 202 87 93 22 115 61 42 12 239 62 150 27
Skype 431 87 55 16 16 152 13 60 79 192 19 87 86
Instagram 350 0 0 0 0 44 25 6 13 306 103 88 115
AccuWeather 283 0 0 0 0 233 100 109 24 50 5 23 22
Snapchat 205 32 13 5 14 59 1 16 42 114 60 27 27
TripAdvisor 153 0 0 0 0 81 34 29 18 72 21 31 20
Shazam 93 0 0 0 0 50 35 11 4 43 10 30 3
Dropbox 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 11 39 6
Evernote 45 0 0 0 0 7 0 1 6 38 1 30 7
Waze 36 11 0 0 11 13 2 6 5 12 0 7 5
iHeartRadio 24 0 0 0 0 17 0 4 13 7 0 2 5
SoundCloud 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 5 9 2
Runtastic 11 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 4 6 0 2 4
Uber 6 1 0 1 0 4 2 1 1 1 0 1 0
Heroes 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1
Subway Surf 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0
Wish 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Yelp 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PERMISSION DECISIONS PER APP, TYPE OF DATA (I.E., CONTACTS, LOCATION, STORAGE) AND TYPE OF DECISION (I.E., ALLOW,
OBFUSCATE, DENY).
App Method category Decision Example Situations
WhatsApp Contacts
Allow
(1) “Adding new contacts.”; (2) “Used because otherwise the
names of the contacts within the app were missing, it wasn’t
really convenient otherwise.”
Obfuscate
(1) “I would use the obfuscation of the contacts most of the
times, because it gives the required information to Whatsapp
(phone number for example) while protecting my privacy.”
Deny
(1) “Never, because I thought that without contacts, Whatsapp
is useless.”
WhatsApp Location
Allow
(1) “Only selected when the pop-up was red.” (when it may
cause the app to crash)
Obfuscate (1) “For finding out position of my friends while chatting.”
Deny
(1) “I denied the access unless I wanted to use a feature of the
applications that required my location, like sharing my position
with a friend within WhatsApp.”
WhatsApp Storage
Allow (1) “To upload some picture.”
Obfuscate
(1) “Used most of the times, so that if the app needs to access
some content that is in its folder.”
Deny (1) “When not actively using the app.”
TripAdvisor Location
Allow
(1) “When I wanted to see my exact position relative to a bar
or a restaurant.”
Obfuscate
(1) “When I wanted to see all the restaurants available near my
house, but do not wanted to give the precise location where I
live.”; (2) “When we do not want to give our exact location,
but still need a service depending on our location.”
Deny (1) “When I did not need location services.”
AccuWeather Location Obfuscate
(1) “I used it most of the time as I expected the functionality
to be fine with coarse grained location.”
TABLE III
EXAMPLES OF REPORTED SITUATIONS WHERE PARTICIPANTS MADE A PERMISSION DECISION FOR A PARTICULAR APP AND DATA TYPE.
